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Asha Kaushal*  Do the Means Change the Ends?  Express
 Entry and Economic Immigration in Canada
The relationship between economy and community is a constitutive tension in the 
Canadian immigration state.  With the rise of the knowledge economy, Canada 
mediated this tension through the concept of human capital, internalized in the points 
system. Introduced in 2015, Express Entry transformed the landscape of economic 
immigration in Canada. Express Entry is an online permanent residence application 
system. In this article, I argue that Express Entry is more than a change in form 
and process; it is a change in substance that shifts Canada’s skilled immigration 
regime toward a neo-corporatist model. By shifting partial decision-making authority 
to the provinces and territories, on the one hand, and to the labour market, on the 
other, Express Entry rebalances the relationship between the federal government 
and private and sub-state parties. Furthermore, it accomplishes this rebalancing 
through the use of Ministerial Instructions, themselves a unique instrument which 
raise democratic transparency and accountability concerns.
La relation entre économie et communauté est une tension constitutive de la 
situation en matière d’immigration au Canada. Avec l’essor de l’économie du savoir, 
le Canada a joué un rôle de médiateur dans cette tension par le biais du concept 
de capital humain, intériorisé dans le système de points. Lancé en 2015, le service 
Entrée express a transformé le paysage de l’immigration économique au Canada. 
Entrée express est un système de demande de résidence permanente en ligne. Dans 
cet article, je soutiens qu’’Entrée express est plus qu’un changement de forme et 
de processus; c’est un changement de fond qui fait passer le régime d’immigration 
des travailleurs qualiﬁ és du Canada à un modèle néo-corporatiste. En transférant le 
pouvoir décisionnel partiel aux provinces et aux territoires, d’une part, et au marché 
du travail, d’autre part, Entrée express rééquilibre la relation entre le gouvernement 
fédéral et les parties privées et infra-étatiques. En outre, il procède à ce rééquilibrage 
par le biais d’instructions ministérielles, un instrument unique en son genre qui soulève 
des préoccupations en matière de transparence démocratique et de responsabilité.
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. This article 
greatly bene¿ ted from the research assistance of Lucie Krajca and Dylan Williams, the helpful 
comments of two anonymous reviewers, and especially from the close reading of Colin Grey.
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Conclusion: from economy to community and back again
While economic priorities are often the central drivers of policy, 
immigration is always also about claims to membership in a political 
community. 
Introduction: Canada’s story of economic immigration
,QPDQ\ZD\V HFRQRPLF LPPLJUDWLRQ WHOOV WKHFRQVWLWXWLYH VWRU\RI WKH
&DQDGLDQ VHWWOHU VWDWH 6KRUWO\ DIWHU SDVVLQJ WKHConstitution Act, 1867
3DUOLDPHQWSDVVHGWKHImmigration Act, 1869ZKLFKJUDQWHGWKH&DELQHW
SRZHU WR UHJXODWH LPPLJUDWLRQ WKURXJK 2UGHUVLQ&RXQFLO 7KUHH \HDUV
ODWHU&DQDGDVHWRXWDGPLVVLRQVFULWHULDIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHEDQQLQJFULPLQDOV
IURPHQWU\6RHPHUJHGRQHRIWKHGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHVRI&DQDGLDQQDWLRQDO
LGHQWLW\ WKH LQH[WULFDELOLW\ RI LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG QDWLRQEXLOGLQJ /RQJ
EHIRUH WKHVH OHJLVODWLYHPHDVXUHVKRZHYHU ODERXUHUVZHUH LPPLJUDWLQJ
 7ULDGD¿ORV7ULDGD¿ORSRXORVHGWanted and Welcome? Policies for Highly Skilled Immigrants 
in Comparative Perspective 6SULQJHU1HZ<RUNDW
 6HH&DWKHULQH'DXYHUJQHThe New Politics of Immigration and the End of the Settler State1HZ
<RUN&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
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informally and under bilateral treaty arrangements. 3 These mostly Chinese 
workers built the country’s transcontinental railroad and worked in its mines 
and ¿ sheries, only to have their immigration restricted upon the railroad’s 
completion in 1885 with the enactment of the Chinese Immigration Act.4
This legislation, widely known as the Chinese head tax, has become an 
apologue in the Canadian historical narrative, a cautionary and regrettable 
tale about avarice and racism. But have these twin exigencies disappeared 
from immigration policymaking or do they, distasteful though they might 
be, represent the historical articulation of the ongoing tension between 
economy and community in matters of immigration? In this article, I argue 
that the relationship between economy and community is a constitutive 
tension in the Canadian immigration state, and that the introduction of the 
Express Entry regime for selecting economic immigrants represents yet 
another iteration of this tension by reinforcing the “rational, managerial, 
and economic focus” of immigration controls.5 
The demands of the settler state meant that Canada understood quickly 
that economic immigration constructs the material and demographic 
nation, simultaneously building the physical economy and the national 
population. ReÀ ecting this understanding, the dynamics of immigration 
have shifted signi¿ cantly since the early days of nation building. Over 
Canada’s immigration history, the pendulum has swung between selecting 
immigrants based on the needs of the labour market and selecting them based 
on considerations of national community. Today, the immigration state has 
a more complicated regulatory apparatus at its ¿ ngertips that it uses to 
direct a regime of strati¿ ed mobility: attracting the best and excluding the 
rest. 6 Countries vie to attract talented economic immigrants by holding out 
special bene¿ ts at the same time that they refuse, interdict, and deport less 
desirable immigrants.7 With the rise of the knowledge economy, Canada 
mediated the tension between economy and community by the concept 
3. See David Scott Fitzgerald & David Cook-Martin, Culling the Masses (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014) at 145.
4. See Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian 
Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 94-98; Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin, 
supra note 3 at 148-149.
5. James P Walsh, “Quantifying Citizens: Neoliberal Restructuring and Immigrant Selection in 
Canada and Australia” (2011) 15:6-7 Citizenship Studies 861 at 864.
6. See Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi, eds, Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and 
Membership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) especially at 187 and c 9; Eleanore Kofman, 
“Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity” (2005) 9:5 Citizenship Studies 453.
7. See Ayelet Shachar, “Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent” 
(2011) 120 Yale L J 2088; Sandra Lavenex, “The Competition State and Multilateral Liberalization of 
Highly Skilled Migration” in Michael Peter Smith & Adrian Favell, eds, The Human Face of Global 
Mobility (New York: Routledge, 2006) at 29.
 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO
of human capital, understood as the sum total of an individual’s skills, 
knowledge, and experience. Internalized in the Canadian points system 
and exalted as the predictor of economic success and social adaptability, 
human capital has functioned as a signi¿ er for the productivity of future 
citizens. In recent years, however, the role for human capital has shifted 
as Canada’s economic immigration programs undergo signi¿ cant changes.
To place this in context, economic immigrants constitute over half of 
the country’s annual immigration target of approximately 300,000 people, 
making them the largest category of entrants.8 However, scholarship about 
economic immigration tends to focus on its extremes. At one pole is the 
highly mobile pool of global talent: cosmopolitan migrants whom states 
lure with promises of prestigious positions and accelerated citizenship.9
At the other pole is the less mobile pool of temporary unskilled labourers, 
the precarious workers whom states desperately need but refuse to keep.10
While scholarship focuses on these extremes, the majority of the 156,000 
economic immigrants admitted to Canada each year are actually skilled 
workers and their accompanying family members. 11 In other words, the 
wide and squishy middle of the economic immigration hierarchy generates 
most of Canada’s economic immigrants. This broad middle used to be 
pulled into the country through the points system, which calculated the 
human capital and adaptability of skilled workers based on a numerical 
points assessment. However, over the past decade, economic immigration 
to Canada has stealthily changed form, culminating in the Express Entry 
system. 
The advent of Express Entry in January 2015, though not dismantling 
the points system, signi¿ cantly shifted its shape and content, none of 
which is readily apparent from a close reading of the legislation. The 
government agency in charge of immigration, Immigration, Refugees 
and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), suggests that Express Entry is largely a 
8. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017 Annual Report to Parliament on 
Immigration, Minister: the Hon Ahmed D Hussen (Ottawa: IRCC, 2017) [IRCC 2017 Annual Report]. 
9. See Ayelet Shachar, “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration 
Regimes” (2006) 81:1 NYUL Rev 148; Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, 
2nd ed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
10. See Faye Faraday, Pro¿ ting from the Precarious: How Recruitment Practices Exploit Migrant 
Workers (Toronto: Metcalfe Foundation, 2014); Faye Faraday, Made in Canada: How the Law 
Constructs Migrant Workers’ Insecurity (Toronto: Metcalfe Foundation, 2012); Sarah Marsden, 
Enforcing Exclusion: Precarious Migrants and the Law in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018); 
Luin Goldring & Patricia Landolt, eds, Producing and Negotiating Non-Citizenship: Precarious Legal 
Status in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), c 4. 
11. See IRCC Canada 2017 Annual Report, supra note 8.
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change in form. 12 But all good students of critical legal studies know that 
form changes substance. Indeed, parts of the legal scaffolding of Express 
Entry render the online intake management system—the eligibility stage, 
which will be explored further in the second section of this paper—far 
more signi¿ cant than it initially appears. Not only does Express Entry 
rebalance the relationship between the federal government and private 
and sub-state parties, it accomplishes this rebalancing through the use 
of Ministerial Instructions, themselves a unique policy instrument which 
raise democratic transparency and accountability concerns. The means of 
Express Entry thus mark a shift in ends. This shift sounds in two registers: 
the means of creating Express Entry through Ministerial Instructions 
and the means of selecting economic immigrants internal to the Express 
Entry regime. These means change the relationship between economy and 
community, moving us further toward an immigration model of people as 
economic market outputs and further away from people as political and 
social members in a national community. 
Part I begins with an analysis of Canada’s story of economic 
immigration. In this Part, I brieÀ y review the history of economic immigrants 
in the Canadian state and then turn to situating the Canadian model among 
the various typologies of economic immigration. This section focuses 
on the historical turn away from the labour market and the theoretical 
turn toward human capital. The human capital model, expressed in the 
points system, dominated economic immigration discourse in Canada 
and beyond for at least three decades. This section analyzes the meaning 
of human capital in the international mobility context and the balance 
of economy and community internalized there. The concept of human 
capital in the points system sought to calibrate short-term labour ¿ t with 
long-term citizenship by including measures of personal attributes such 
as age  and adaptability. The points system suffered some poor outcomes, 
however, and the rise of Express Entry marks a turn away from human 
capital (although it retains the points system and layers another on top, as 
explained in Part II) and toward the national and regional labour markets. 
Part II provides a comprehensive description of the Express Entry 
system. This description, while sometimes technical, is necessary to 
understand the analysis that follows. A robust academic explanation of 
the law and operation of Express Entry has not yet been published, and 
12. This language pervades government documents about the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). 
See, e.g., Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 7KH ([SUHVV (QWU\ <HDU(QG 5HSRUW
 (Ottawa: IRCC, 2017) [EE Year-End Report 2016] (“Express Entry is Canada’s application 
management system”). The Liberal government changed the name of Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC) to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) soon after taking of¿ ce. 
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scholars remain confused about which parts of the original points system 
survive and where they reside. Moreover, although both the points system 
and the Express Entry regime are juridical creations, the bulk of academic 
analysis about them is produced by other disciplines, notably political 
science. This Part contributes to legal understandings of the text and 
operation of the Express Entry system. It also provides the foundation 
for considering how changes to the selection mode and criteria for entry 
of economic immigrants has repercussions both for lawmaking processes 
and the distribution of legal authority, examined in Part III, and for the 
relationship between economy and community in the immigration state. 
In Part III, I examine the more profound changes accomplished by 
the Express Entry regime. Based on the operational framework laid out 
in Part II, I critically examine the legal creation of Express Entry (the 
basis of its legal authority) and the legal decision makers instantiated by 
it (the distribution of its legal authority). The former focuses on the legal 
scaffolding of the Express Entry regime as created through the instrument 
of Ministerial Instructions, while the latter focuses on the shift of decision-
making authority to employers and provinces. Express Entry marks a 
fundamental shift in both the role of the Canadian federal government in 
selecting immigrants and its historically more consultative processes of 
immigration lawmaking. This is much more than a swing of the pendulum 
toward the labour market. If indeed “immigration is the last bastion 
of sovereignty” and the core of that sovereignty is the ability to pick 
members, then permitting employers and provinces to choose immigrants 
loosens the knot between immigration and nation-building.13 The nature of 
decentralizing admissions decisions in this manner means that the federal 
government loses control over selection criteria. Moreover, at the same 
time that decision making authority was devolved, the rise of Ministerial 
Instructions removed the capacity for public participation in immigration 
policymaking. Together, these changes suggest that the values conveyed by 
Express Entry suggest a different, less signi¿ cant role for the community 
and citizen in the immigration selection process. The article then concludes 
with some thoughts about the constitutive tension between economy and 
community in our ever-evolving knowledge society. 
I. (PERGLHGHFRQRPLFV"7KHSRLQWVV\VWHPLQSHUVSHFWLYH
Following the concept of human capital through recent Canadian history 
reveals its established role as a backbone of economic immigrant selection 
as well as its changing shape over time. As part of broader efforts to 
13. Catherine Dauvergne, 0DNLQJ3HRSOH,OOHJDO (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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compare economic immigration laws across countries, the International 
Organization of Migration and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development distinguish between two models of skilled immigration: 
supply-driven systems (human capital selection) and demand-driven 
systems (employer selection).14 The variable in these models is the 
selector and, implicitly, the selection criteria. Rey Koslowski suggests 
an intervening third model, the QHRFRUSRUDWLVWPRGHO, which is based on 
government selection of immigrants using a points system with extensive 
business and labour participation.15 The neo-corporatist model lies between 
the KXPDQ FDSLWDO PRGHO, which is based on government selection of 
immigrants using a points system, and the GHPDQGGULYHQPRGHO, which is 
based on employer selection of immigrants. The former Canadian points 
system model was the prototype of the human capital model; the United 
States is the prototype for the demand-driven model; and Australia was 
Koslowski’s catalyst for the hybrid neo-corporatist model.16 As Canada 
has re¿ ned its human capital approach over time, so too has it moved 
along this continuum toward the neo-corporatist model. 
Neo-corporatism is a political economy approach to state-society 
relations that is based on a system of interest representation.17 Typically, 
it requires direct participation by civil society intermediary groups.18
When applied to the immigration context, neo-corporatism focuses on 
the way that states “manage the pressures deriving from transnational 
and international constraints with the structure of interests internal to 
the receiving society.”19 It is most applicable in the context of economic 
immigration where business interests seek to represent their labour needs 
in state fora.  Both as a theory and a framework, neo-corporatism adds 
third parties back into immigration policymaking where they may have 
been absent before. I use the term “third parties” broadly to refer to both 
sub-state and non-state actors in order to mark distinctions from former 
14. See Anna Boucher & Lucie Cerna, “Current Policy Trends in Skilled Immigration Policy” 
(2014) 52:3 Intl Migration 21. 
15. Rey Koslowski, “Selective Migration Policy Models and Changing Realities of Implementation” 
(2014) 52:3 Intl Migration 26 at 27.
16. ,ELG
17. Philippe C Schmitter, “Neo-Corporatism” in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo 
Morlino, eds, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QF\FORSHGLDRI3ROLWLFDO6FLHQFH (USA: Sage Publications, 2011). It is 
often juxtaposed to pluralism, which envisions a more spontaneous and episodic relationship between 
groups and the state. 
18. Éric Montpetit, “Can Québec Neo-Corporatist Networks Withstand Canadian Federalism and 
Internationalization” in Alain Gagnon, ed, 4XHEHF6WDWHDQG6RFLHW\ (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004).
19. Giuseppe Sciortino, “Toward a Political Sociology of Entry Policies: Conceptual Problems and 
Theoretical Proposals” (2010) 26:2 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 213 at 218. 
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centralized models of federal immigration jurisdiction. As an ideal-typical 
model, neo-corporatism illuminates the marked and growing space for 
labour market interests in immigration policymaking. 
For Koslowski, Australia is the ideal-typical model of neo-corporatism 
because “government, industry, and labour collectively shape immigration 
policy much like “neo-corporatist” economic development strategies.”20
These models require some disaggregation, as Koslowski recognizes 
but does not undertake, in order to understand their arterial pathways. 
This disaggregation runs along four axes: Who triggers the immigration 
process? Who selects? According to what criteria? Who sets the selection 
criteria and how? The answers to these questions will not always be 
straightforward, but provide insight into how large or small the role for 
economic interests in immigration matters. As a lens on the shifting 
relationship between economy and community, neo-corporatism captures 
the tenor of the new Express Entry system. It adds rigour to the claim that 
Express Entry has shifted all of the axes of economic immigration closer 
to the market-oriented, demand-driven pole. 
Canada has a long history of business interests setting immigration 
priorities.21 Starting with the Canadian Paci¿ c Railway agreement in 1880, 
industrialists earnestly promoted immigration as a source of labour.22
Although business support would wax and wane in tandem with xenophobic 
sentiments, business interests tended to prioritize labour. The years leading 
up to World War II focused on maintaining a homogeneous society by 
growing the population in line with racial and national origin restrictions. 
After World War II, sponsored family immigrants dominated admissions 
while the economy grew. 23 Finally, in 1967, the Canadian government 
ended formal discrimination.24 The priority of economy returned to the 
forefront with the Liberal Government’s White Paper on immigration 
20. Koslowski, VXSUD note 15 at 27. 
21. See Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin, VXSUD note 3 at 143-144.
22. Kelley & Trebilcock, VXSUD note 4 at 94-95; Valerie Knowles, 6WUDQJHUVDWRXU*DWHV&DQDGLDQ
,PPLJUDWLRQDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ3ROLF\± (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016) at 72, referring to contract 
with Andrew Onderdonk for western CPR construction in 1880. See also articles of agreement 
introduced by Sir Charles Tupper in Royal Commission, “Report on the Canadian Paci¿ c Railway” 
vol III (1882) at 22-23. 
23. See Edwina O’Shea, “Missing the Point(s): The Declining Fortunes of Canada’s Economic 
Immigration Programs” (2009) Transatlantic Academy Paper Series at 4.  
24. The move was underway with the 1962 Order in Council and amended Immigration Regulations, 
but those reforms left administrative discretion to discriminate intact. See Triada¿ lopoulos,VXSUD note 
1 at 23-28. Finally, the 1967 Immigration Regulations marked the introduction of the points system 
and the end of ethnic selection.
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policy in 1966. 25 Its recommendations reconnected immigration to the 
labour market and eliminated discrimination by employing objective 
criteria to assess skills and experiences. The resulting points system for 
independent immigrants then governed Canadian immigration law for the 
next ¿ fty years.26
1. 7KHJUDGXDOHQWUHQFKPHQWRIKXPDQFDSLWDO
Canada is widely celebrated in immigration circles for pioneering the points 
system, which was designed to measure the human capital of economic 
immigrants. The points system sought to assess potential for successful 
establishment in Canada.27 It solicited educated and adaptable immigrants 
who could function as nimble and À exible inputs in the domestic labour 
market: ¿ lling gaps, rising through the ranks, and seamlessly shifting 
between ¿ rms. The points model has been emulated in other countries 
of immigration, including Australia, adopted in modi¿ ed form in several 
other countries such as Denmark, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, 
and perennially debated in the United States and lately in Germany.28 Most 
recently, however, Canada stands at the vanguard (after New Zealand and 
Australia) in segueing the points system into a hybrid labour market driven 
model of selection.
The points system represented the culmination of several currents in 
Canadian immigration law. First, it marked the shift from a sponsorship 
dominated kinship-based admission cohort to an economics-based 
admissions cohort. Second, it signaled a move from the short-term 
assessment of labour market needs to the longer-term assessment of 
employability and societal integration. Third, it clearly expressed the 
human capital approach to immigration selection, combining potential 
economic contribution and social integration in a set of selection factors. 
Far from static, the points categories and their allocations expressed 
different socio-political relationships to the labour market over time.
In its 1967 initial incarnation, the points system combined two sets 
of attributes: human capital factors, such as education and language, and 
labour market factors.29 They were linked by the criteria of “occupational 
demand”—which was measured according to a list prepared by the 
25. See Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, :KLWH 3DSHU RQ ,PPLJUDWLRQ, and 
Wallace B Chung & Madeline H Chung Collection (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) [White Paper]. 
26. See PC 1967-1616, (1967) C Gaz II, vol 96, no 3, 1350-62. 
27. See O’Shea,VXSUD note 23 at 4. 
28. Ayelet Shachar, “The Brave New World of Strati¿ ed Mobility” in Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi, eds, 
0LJUDWLRQLQ3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\7KH(WKLFVRI0RYHPHQWDQG0HPEHUVKLS (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016) at 181-182.  
29. O’Shea, VXSUD note 23 at 4. 
 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO
Department of Manpower and Immigration—and “speci¿ c vocational 
preparation,” which assessed training for the occupation.30 Under that 
system, labour market factors accounted for 35 points and human capital 
factors were worth a possible total of 40 points, with the passmark set 
at 50 points.31 The 1967 regulations also granted 15 points for “personal 
suitability” and 35 to 50 points for the presence of a family member, factors 
which could clearly tip the balance.32 The 1978 regulations maintained 
the passmark but reversed the balance in the selection factors, offering 
up to 48 points for labour market factors, and 32 points for human capital 
factors.33 The increased value of labour market factors was primarily due 
to the introduction of the work experience factor and the increase of points 
available for speci¿ c vocational training and education. 
The economic downturn in the early 1980s prompted the reduction 
of the number of independent immigrants by introducing the requirement 
of an approved job offer. This requirement was lifted in 1986, shifting 
selection points from occupational demand to language, reduced the 
assisted relative factor, and raised the passmark to 70 points, amid 
renewed attention to the integration of economic immigrants.34 Again in 
1992, triggered by concern about the need for an educated workforce in 
the knowledge economy, the government reemphasized the human capital 
factors.35 These amendments raised the number of points available for 
education, adding more points for university or postsecondary credentials 
and speci¿ c vocational preparation. As Edwina O’Shea concludes: 
Taken together with the 1986 measures, the effect was by 1993 to 
move a considerable distance away from the original vision of the 1978 
regulations, with increasing emphasis placed on core human capital 
factors—language and education – and less weight given to the role of 
the labour market.36
The move from occupational demand factors toward human capital 
factors can be seen as rooting the value of the economic immigrant “¿ rst 
and foremost in the individual’s personal attributes, rather than in his or 
30. Ibid at 5. 
31. See Alan G Green & David A Green, “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy, 
Past and Present” (1999) 25(4) Can Public Policy 425; O’Shea, supra note 23 at 5. 
32. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 5. 
33. Ibid at 6; Immigration Regulations, SOR/78-172, s 42. 
34. See O’Shea, ibid at 8. 
35. Ibid; Canada, Bill C-86, An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and Other Acts in Consequence 
Thereof, 3rd Sess, 34th Parl, 1992, assented to on 27 December 1992. 
36. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 10. 
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her contributions as a worker per se.”37 These changes took hold in the 
context of a more general effort to raise the absolute number of economic 
immigrants and to adjust the balance between economic immigrants and 
others in accordance with a 60:40 ratio.38 
The next decade marked the pinnacle of the human capital model. 
Despite suggestions from academics and government of¿ cials that 
recent economic immigrants were stumbling in the labour market, the 
regulations promulgated under the 2002 legislation, the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA], doubled down on the human 
capital framework.39 There was a shared belief among economists and 
policymakers that micromanaging immigration based on labour market 
demand was “ineffective and created unrealistic expectations among new 
immigrants.”40 The resulting set of core competencies, which is still in use 
today, valued language ability, education, age, occupational experience, 
and adaptability. The “personal suitability” and “assisted relative” factors 
were gone, both folded into “adaptability,” designed to measure potential 
to adapt based on relatives in Canada or spousal work or study here. The 
education factor was weighted in favour of post-secondary university 
quali¿ cations. The occupational experience factor was tied to listed skilled 
occupations contained in the National Occupational Classi¿ cation (NOC) 
taxonomy.41 There was no direct assessment of labour market demand, 
although an approved job offer could still garner 10 points. The focus 
instead was on prior work experience in a skilled occupation.42 Education, 
language, and work experience (human capital factors) could garner 70 
points among them, while age and adaptability added another possible 
37. Antje Ellerman, “Human Capital Citizenship and the Changing Logic of Immigrant Admissions” 
(2019) J Ethnic & Migration Studies 1 at 11.
38. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 10-11. 
39. The research showed that the temporary earnings gap between new immigrants and Canadian-
born workers, which used to disappear over time, was becoming wider and narrowing more slowly 
than before, see O’Shea, supra note 23 at 9. In the White Paper, supra note 25, that preceded the 
IRPA, the government tied the occupational demand factor to the deteriorating outcomes of economic 
immigrants. 
40. O’Shea, supra note 23 at 12, citing Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Building a Strong 
Foundation for 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation 
(Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1998); Canada, Immigration Legislative Review, 
Advisory Group, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration, Chair: Robert 
Trempe (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), c 6,  criticizing labour 
market factors as disregarding the À uidity of labour markets and arguing that occupation-based 
selection did not prepare applicants well for establishing a life in Canada. 
41. The NOC is a taxonomy of more than 30,000 occupations sorted in 500 Unit Groups and 
organized according to skill levels and skill types. 
42. O’Shea, supra note 23 at 13. 
 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO
20 points.43 These allocations reÀ ected a longer-term approach to labour 
market success and social integration. 
In 2002, applicants required a minimum of 75 points to qualify as skilled 
workers eligible for permanent residency. 44 In their 2002 instantiation, 
“the IRPA selection factors represent an almost complete realization of a 
‘human capital model’ for managing economic immigration.”45 It is true 
that human capital factors pervaded the points system from its inception, 
but for some scholars the human capital model assumed full form only 
when the labour market demand factors were no longer a signi¿ cant 
part of the points calculus. Certainly, the 2002 points system sits at the 
supply-side pole of the continuum: the immigration process is triggered 
by the skilled worker applicant, who is selected by the federal government 
according to its own points system criteria, which are largely insulated 
from labour market demands. Since 2002, the government has amended 
the points allocations, moving points from work experience to language 
and age, introducing additional weight for the job offer in the adaptability 
criteria (thus somewhat diluting the human capital approach), and setting 
the pass mark at 67 points (see Figure 1).46
)LJXUH3RLQWV6\VWHP,PPLJUDWLRQDQG5HIXJHH3URWHFWLRQ5HJXODWLRQVVV
 Education  25 points
 Of¿ cial Languages  28 points
 Experience  15 points
 Age  12 points
 Arranged Employment  10 points
 Adaptability  10 points
2. The measure of a human
The shift from industrial, resource-based economies to knowledge ones has 
changed the type of economic immigrants that countries of immigration 
seek to attract. Skilled workers, especially highly-skilled workers, are 
the linchpins of the knowledge economy.47 The term “human capital” 
seeks to identify and assemble these workers under its umbrella. In its 
¿ rst expression, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations described human 
43. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].
44. Ibid, original version of regulations. 
45. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 13. 
46. IRPR, supra note 43.
47. De¿ nitions of the highly skilled vary, but the most obvious markers are education and occupation. 
There is an evolving consensus based on both tertiary education (meaning, completion of a formal 
two-year college degree or more) and professional occupation. For example, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, together with Eurostat, developed a conceptual framework 
called the Canberra Manual focused on the science and technology occupations. 
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capital as acquired and useful talents.48 Economists seized on the concept 
of human capital again in the 1960s, reaf¿ rming its ties to economic 
growth. 49 It has been usefully de¿ ned as “the aggregation of the innate 
abilities and the knowledge and skills that individuals acquire and develop 
throughout their lifetime.”50 The immigration context prioritizes the 
acquired skills component of this de¿ nition of human capital, speci¿ cally 
intergenerational transfers of knowledge (including language), work 
experience, and education. Notably, unlike physical capital, which is 
readily transferable, human capital is inseparable from the human being.51
In the immigration context, it is precisely this embodied nature that 
makes human capital such a powerful category. It is the idea that people add 
capital to their minds and bodies through skills and knowledge acquisition. 
This makes it uniquely suited to immigration because it travels easily with 
the individual across the international border. The mobility of human 
capital clari¿ es the important distinction between human capital and 
labour. For economists, the primary purpose of measuring and acquiring 
human capital is to increase the productivity of labour, but human capital 
and labour are not coeval.52 Human capital, understood as the stock of 
skills and knowledge in an individual, adds value to labour and acts as an 
input into labour productivity. It captures a number of pre-labour factors 
such as education, language, and past experience that represent a more 
holistic view of homo economicus. Under conditions of mobility, there 
are two interpretations of human capital that shed light on its conceptual 
value in selection processes.53 Theodore Schultz and Richard Nelson 
and Edmund Phelps view human capital primarily as the capacity to 
adapt. In their view, human capital is especially useful in dealing with 
disequilibrium situations or changed environments (such as new country 
settings). Meanwhile, Michael Spence views human capital as a signal of 
ability rather than a set of independent characteristics that are useful in the 
production process. For Spence, human capital metrics are signals about 
some other characteristics of workers, such as motivation and discipline. 
48. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 2 (1776). 
49. See Mireille Laroche, Marcel Mérette & G C Ruggeri, “On the Concept and Dimensions of 
Human Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy Context” (1999) 25:1 Can Pub Pol’y 87 at 87. 
50. See ibid at 89. 
51. See ibid at 90. 
52. Paul M Johnson, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms (Auburn: Auburn University, 1994–
2005), online: <www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/human_capital> [perma.cc/KYD4-5QYX]; Arthur 
O’Sullivan & Steven M. Sheffrin, Economics: Principles in Action (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 2003) at 5: “Human capital refers to the stock of skills and knowledge embodied in the ability to 
perform labour so as to produce economic value.”
53. For a selection of interpretations of human capital, see Daron Acemoglu & David Autor, Lectures 
in Labor Economics, online: <economics.mit.edu/¿ les/4689> [perma.cc/6X3T-Y2TM].
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Taken together, these perspectives explain that the relationship between 
human capital and labour productivity is not the whole picture; the metric 
of human capital implicitly captures other characteristics and capacities, 
ones that might facilitate integration into communities as much as markets. 
In the immigration context, the concept of human capital underwrites 
the points system and is used to assess immigrant potential for the primary 
purpose of labour market integration, while still attuned to the immigrant’s 
broader integration into society. 54 As demonstrated by political theorists, 
citizenship goes beyond bare legal status to encompass the political 
dimension of governance and participation and the psychological dimension 
of membership and belonging.55 The weight accorded to human capital 
factors such as language skills, education, and adaptability criteria—
such as family connections and past Canadian education and work—are 
directed toward these other dimensions of community and citizenship. 
Walsh explains this relationship: “[t]he points systems directly reÀ ect such 
concerns as credentials and other signs of human capital are constituted as 
markers of personal initiative, self-improvement, risk-avoiding behavior 
and other moral traits and ‘attributes which evidence a high degree of self-
suf¿ ciency.’”56 These characteristics, while undoubtedly animated by the 
state’s desire to help economic immigrants adjust to cyclical and structural 
labour market changes,57 are nonetheless embodied and individualized, 
and thus translatable into other domains. Stated differently, human 
capital builds the community, too. Although the sole governing criterion 
for selecting economic immigrants under the IRPA is their “ability to 
become economically established in Canada,” embedded in the idea of 
“establishment” are broader dimensions of citizenship.
In theory, human capital tries to gauge both economic potential and 
social adaptability, acknowledging that human beings enter both an 
economy and a community when they immigrate, and that success in 
the former is intertwined with settlement in the latter. Economic success, 
54. See Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, 
Employment Equity and Globalization (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002) at 79; Yasmeen Abu-
Laban, “Jean Chrétien’s Immigration Legacy” (2004) 9:1 Rev Const Stud 133. 
55. Jean L Cohen, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos” (1999) 
14:3 International Sociology 245; Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey 
of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory” (1994) 104:2 Ethics 352; Joseph Carens, Culture, Citizenship, 
and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
56. See Walsh, supra note 5 at 874.
57. On labour market changes, see Ana Ferrer, Garnett Picot & William Craig Riddell, “New 
Directions in Immigration Policy: Canada’s Evolving Approach to the Selection of Economic 
Immigrants” (2014) 48:3 Intl Migration Rev 846 at 850; Immigration Refugee Protection Act, SC 
2001 c 27, s 12(2) [IRPA].
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however, proved elusive. This was not news to labour economists 
or sociologists, who had warned of declining economic outcomes of 
immigrants for over a decade. 58 Almost at the same time that the IRPA 
crystallized the human capital approach to economic immigration, the 
data on deteriorating immigrant economic outcomes started to grow, 
revealing problems of unemployment and underemployment that linked 
up with concerns about brain waste.59 Several studies noted the rise in the 
earnings gap between recent immigrants and Canadian born workers.60
They pointed to explanations “such as the changing source regions of 
entering immigrants, declining returns to foreign labor market experience, 
deterioration in the outcomes for new labor market entrants in general, 
education quality, language skills, and sectoral economic downturns.”61
Ferrer et al. pointed out that language skills seem “to mediate the rate 
of return to formal education” (immigrants with strong language skills 
can more easily convert their education to earnings),62 however, the 
“apocryphal immigrant taxi driver with a Ph.D.”63 became increasingly 
real. Labour market discrimination combined with obstacles to foreign 
credential recognition compounded the problem. Research suggested 
that the latter were primarily due to provincial and independent licensing 
bodies—problems of federalism and private sector professional regulation, 
in other words, not problems squarely within the purview of immigration 
law.64 Concurrently, the relatively low minimum pass mark of 67 and 
administrative inef¿ ciencies started to generate a growing backlog of 
economic class applications. 
There were several ad hoc responses to these concerns—initiatives 
for foreign credential recognition, an uptick in the number of immigrants 
admitted because they were nominated through provincial programs to 
meet local labour-market needs, the expansion of the temporary foreign 
58. See Ferrer, Picot & Riddell, supra note 57 at 850. See also Jeffrey G Reitz, “Immigration 
Employment Success in Canada, Part II: Understanding the Decline” (2007) 8:1 Intl Migration & 
Immigration 37; Statistics Canada, The Deteriorating Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible 
Causes: Update 2005, by Garnett Picot & Arthur Sweetman, Analytical Studies Branch Research 
Paper Series No 262 (Ottawa: Business Labour Market Analysis Division, Stats Can, 2005); James 
T McDonald et al, Canadian Immigration: Economic Evidence for a Dynamic Policy Environment 
(Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2010). 
59. See Ferrer, Picot & Riddell, supra note 57 at 850. Note the temporal gap here: the data analyzes 
immigrants who arrived before the human capital points system.  
60. Ibid at 846-867. See also studies cited above in note 58.  
61. Ibid at 850; Garnett Picot, Feng Hou & Simon Coulombe, “Poverty Dynamics Among Recent 
Immigrants to Canada” (2008) 42:2 Intl Migration Rev 393; Picot & Sweetman, supra note 58. 
62. See Ferrer, Picot & Riddell, supra note 57 at 850.
63. O’Shea, supra note 23 at 15. 
64. See discussion in Jeffrey G Reitz, “Taxi Driver Syndrome: Behind-the-Scenes Changes are 
Creating New Problems on Top of Old Ones” (2011) 19:2 Literary Rev of Can 20.  
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worker program, and the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class, a 
permanent entry stream for those already in Canada temporarily for work 
or school65—all of which foreshadowed the shift toward employers and 
provinces and away from the federal human capital model. The minority 
Conservative government elected in 2006 initiated a series of ambitious 
reforms, which accelerated when it won a majority in 2011, amending 
the legislation more than a dozen times and making even larger changes 
outside of the formal legislative arena.66 These multivalent changes shared 
a common core: immigration categories were rationalized and immigrant 
archetypes began to permeate government discourse. 67 In the economic 
class, meeting immediate labour market needs became the premise for the 
creation of new or revised streams—and federal skilled workers were up 
¿ rst.
II. Express Entry as an intake management system and beyond
The year 2008 marked a watershed in Canadian immigration law. The 
backlog of skilled worker applications reached 600,000.68 In part to handle 
this backlog, the government made use of a novel legislative instrument 
in the immigration realm: Ministerial Instructions. Beginning that year, 
the government amended the IRPA to allow the Minister to issue various 
sets of instructions. Signi¿ cant for shifting away from the pure human 
capital model is section 87.3, under which authority the Minister may 
alter the processing of applications, including electing not to process 
some of them.69 Later Ministerial Instructions allowed the minister to 
triage applications according to revised criteria, including the requirement 
for experience in a listed occupation, an arranged offer of employment, 
or Canadian legal residency.70 In  2008, the pendulum of the Canadian 
economic immigration program began to swing back to labour market 
demand and the path was paved for Express Entry.
In January 2015, the Express Entry system opened its online portals 
for applications. Then-Minister Jason Kenney described it as a “dating 
site,” and it was widely reported to be an online matchmaker, connecting 
65. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 18-20; Naomi Alboim & Karen Cohl, Shaping the Future: Canada’s 
Rapidly Changing Immigration Policies (Toronto: Maytree Foundation, 2012).
66. These larger changes were accomplished by Ministerial Instructions, detailed below.
67. See Peter J Carver, “A Failed Discourse of Distrust Amid Signi¿ cant Procedural Change: The 
Harper Government’s Legacy in Immigration and Refugee Law” (2016) 21:2 Rev Const Stud 209.
68. See Liang v Canada, 2012 FC 758. 
69. See O’Shea, supra note 23 at 22; IRPA, supra note 57, ss 87.4, 87.5 (terminated pre-February 
2008 applications with no decision by March 2012). 
70. Ministerial Instructions, (2008) C Gaz I, Vol. 142, No. 48, at 3043, online (pdf): <http://
publications.gc.ca/gazette/archives/p1/2008/2008-11-29/pdf/g1-14248.pdf> [perma.cc/86Y2-
NRNU]. 
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LPPLJUDQWVWRHPSOR\HUVDQGSURYLQFHV71'HVLJQHGWRSURYLGHÀH[LELOLW\
SURFHVVLQJ VSHHG DQG UHVSRQVLYHQHVV WR QDWLRQDO DQG UHJLRQDO ODERXU
PDUNHWV WKH ([SUHVV (QWU\ V\VWHP FUHDWHV D SRRO RI FDQGLGDWHV IURP
ZKLFKHPSOR\HUVSURYLQFHVDQG,5&&FDQVHOHFWLPPLJUDQWV72 Although 
GHVFULEHGDVDQHZSURFHVVIRUPDQDJLQJH[LVWLQJHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDWLRQ
SURJUDPV([SUHVV(QWU\ORRVHO\FRLQFLGHGZLWKWKHVXEVWDQWLYHUHYLVLRQ
DQG H[SDQVLRQ RI WKRVH SURJUDPV OHDYLQJ WKH WKH WHUUDLQ RI HFRQRPLF
LPPLJUDWLRQDOPRVWXQUHFRJQL]DEOH1HZFDWHJRULHVZHUHFUHDWHGZKLOH
other regulatory categories were rendered defunct, and all of this was 
DFFRPSOLVKHG WKURXJK 0LQLVWHULDO ,QVWUXFWLRQV /HVV WKDQ D \HDU DIWHU
launch, the Conservative government was defeated. The new Liberal 
JRYHUQPHQWWKDWWRRNRI¿FHLQKHULWHGDZLOGO\UHYLVHGLPPLJUDWLRQUHJLPH
DQG DQ XQFKDUWHG ([SUHVV (QWU\ V\VWHP ERWK RI ZKLFK LW FRQWLQXHV WR
UH¿QH
,Q VHYHUDO UHVSHFWV WKH ([SUHVV (QWU\ V\VWHP VLPSO\ WRRN WKH
HOHPHQWVRIWKHIRUPHUSRLQWVV\VWHPDQGUHDUUDQJHGWKHPLQWRDGLIIHUHQW
FRQ¿JXUDWLRQ ,QGHHG ,5&& H[SUHVVO\ VWDWHV WKDW ([SUHVV (QWU\ GRHV
QRW FKDQJH WKH LPPLJUDWLRQ SURJUDP UHTXLUHPHQWV73 It is true that the 
GH¿QLWLRQV RI VNLOO UHPDLQ WKH VDPH7KH\ FRQWLQXH WR EH EDVHG RQ WKH
1DWLRQDO2FFXSDWLRQDO&ODVVL¿FDWLRQZKLFKZDVDOZD\VSDUWRIWKHSRLQWV
V\VWHPGHWHUPLQDWLRQ7KHKXPDQFDSLWDOFULWHULDDOVRUHPDLQEURDGO\WKH
VDPHDOWKRXJKWKH\LQWHUQDOL]HPRUHVWULQJHQWSDVVWKUHVKROGVIRUODQJXDJH
DQGHGXFDWLRQDO DVVHVVPHQWV DQGZHLJK WKHVHGLIIHUHQWO\2Q WRSRI WKH
UHJXODWRU\SRLQWVVFKHPHKRZHYHU([SUHVV(QWU\OD\HUHGDVHFRQGSRLQWV
V\VWHPWKH&RPSUHKHQVLYH5DQNLQJ6\VWHP&56ZKLFKXVHVWKHWRROV
RISRLQWVDOORFDWLRQDQGUDQNLQJWRSULRULWL]HDSSOLFDWLRQVYRXFKHGIRUE\
SURYLQFHVRUHPSOR\HUV([SUHVV(QWU\LVQRWRQO\DQRQOLQHPDQDJHPHQW
tool, it is also a new selection model. The choice to double down on the 
SRLQWV V\VWHP ZKLOH SULRULWL]LQJ SURYLQFLDO QRPLQDWLRQV DQG MRE RIIHUV
PHDQV WKDW GLIIHUHQW DSSOLFDQWVZLOO WRS WKH OLVW DQG WKH LQYLWDWLRQRQO\
UDQNLQJV\VWHPPHDQVWKDWRQO\VRPHRIWKRVHLQWKHSRROZLOOPDNHWKH
cut.
71. 6HH6WHYHQ&KDVH³2WWDZDWRSOD\PDWFKPDNHUIRUIRUHLJQZRUNHUV1HZV\VWHPZLOOEHµOLNH
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1. The eligibility stage 
The application process begins with the creation of an online Express 
Entry pro¿ le that functions as an “expression of interest” in immigrating to 
Canada.74 There is no cost for creating a pro¿ le. This is the ¿ rst threshold 
of the selection process, the eligibility stage. To be eligible to be part of 
the Express Entry pool, applicants must meet the regulatory criteria for 
one of the named economic sub-classes: Federal Skilled Workers (FSW), 
Federal Skilled Trades (FST), the Canadian Experience Class (CEC), or 
some portions of the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). 
The legal basis for selecting immigrants in the economic classes 
remains their ability to become economically established in Canada.75
This is measured slightly differently for each sub-class. )HGHUDO6NLOOHG
:RUNHUV are the largest of the skilled immigrant sub-classes. 76 Since 
1967 skilled workers have been assessed under the points system. As set 
out in Part I, the points system uses point allocations to identify “high 
human capital” immigrants with the ability to establish economically in 
Canada. 77 First, however, FSWs must meet certain minimum regulatory 
requirements: one year of work experience, language pro¿ ciency, an 
assessed educational credential, and settlement funds or a job offer.78 If 
an applicant meets these minimum regulatory requirements, then IRCC 
assesses her application based on the regulatory points grid.79 The minimum 
points threshold remains 67 points, and Express Entry candidates will not 
succeed in obtaining permanent residence if they score lower than this.80
The points system thus survives in the deep underbelly of Express Entry, 
operating as part of the test for eligibility.81 If the applicant meets all of 
74. The Express Entry program was originally named “Expression of Interest” after the terminology 
of the similar Australian SkillSelect program. 
75. IRPA, supra note 57, s 12(2).
76. See Lynn Fournier-Ruggles, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law for Legal Professionals, 
3rd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 233 (the majority were admitted as federal skilled 
workers); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Report on Plans and Priorities 2015–16 
(Ottawa: IRCC, 2016), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/2015-2016/> 
[perma.cc/QV8Y-2ZR7] [Report on Plans and Priorities]. 
77. Ibid.  
78. See IRPR, supra note 43, s 75(2). These appear to have been ¿ rst added in 2006, with additional 
threshold criteria added in subsequent years. The term “assessed educational credential” refers to the 
requirement to have education assessed by an IRCC designated organization.  
79. Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, Eligibility to Apply as a Federal Skilled Worker 
(Express Entry), (Ottawa: IRCC, 2018), online:  <www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-
who.asp> [perma.cc/X6HV-XAJ3].
80. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Six Selection Factors (Ottawa: IRCC, 2018), 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/express-
entry/eligibility/federal-skilled-workers/six-selection-factors-federal-skilled-workers.html> [perma.
cc/GNQ2-2RFF]. 
81. Remember that the points system only applies to FSWs, not CECs or FSTs. 
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these eligibility requirements, then s/he is placed in the Express Entry 
pool to create a group of pre-screened candidates. In other words, all of 
the candidates in the Express Entry pool would have quali¿ ed as federal 
skilled workers under the old points regime. Express Entry represents an 
additional level of scrutiny and extraction.
The two other occupational streams of Express Entry—the )HGHUDO
6NLOOHG 7UDGHV and &DQDGLDQ ([SHULHQFH &ODVV are relatively new 
programs, neither of which is subject to the original points assessment. 
The government created the FST sub-class in 2013 to deal with labour 
shortages in the trades. It offers permanent residence to skilled trades 
people. This sub-class operates on a pass/fail basis with four mandatory 
regulatory criteria.82 Notably, there is no education requirement for this 
class, but education will earn trades applicants points under Express Entry 
CRS criteria. The CEC sub-class is a two-step transitional category from 
temporary to permanent status. Created in 2008, it initially provided a 
streamlined path to permanent residence for temporary foreign workers 
and international students who have some Canadian experience. The 
core requirement now is to have 12 months of skilled work experience in 
Canada during the three years prior to application.83 IRCC explains that 
the CEC complements the FSW program by using different criteria—such 
as requiring Canadian work experience but not requiring education—to 
“retain talented workers who have demonstrated a capacity to integrate 
successfully and contribute to the Canadian economy.”84
Finally, the 3URYLQFLDO1RPLQHH3URJUDP, also discussed in Part III, 
is for applicants selected by the provinces or territories. Express Entry 
applies to a portion of the provincial nominee programs. It results from 
the shared federal and provincial jurisdiction over immigration and is 
designed to ¿ ll regional labour and demographic shortfalls.85 PNPs rest 
82. IRPR, supra note 43, s, 87.2(1), (3)(a)-(c). Trades people must: work in a skilled trade occupation 
as listed in the NOC, meet minimum language competency requirements, which are lower than for 
skilled workers, have at least 2 years of full-time work experience (or its equivalent) in the last 5 
years performing most of the NOC duties, and have relevant employment experience, either trade 
certi¿ cation or Canadian work experience. 
83. See ibid, ss 87.1(2)(a),(b). Pro¿ ciency in English or French is also required. There is no longer 
an education requirement; Delphine Nakache & Leanne Dixon-Perera, “Temporary or Transitional? 
Migrant Workers’ Experiences with Permanent Residence in Canada” (2015) 55 IRPP.  
84. Report on Plans and Priorities, supra note 76. See Regulations Amending the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulations (Canadian Experience Class), “Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement” (9 August 2008) C Gaz, vol 142, no 32 [Regulatory Impact Statement]. In this Regulatory 
Impact Statement, which accompanied the regulations, the government noted that the skilled worker 
program was not responsive enough to the labour market and overemphasized formal education. See 
also O’Shea, supra note 23 at 20.  
85. See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 95 [Constitution Act] (establishes 
concurrent jurisdiction for immigration and agriculture).
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on a distinction between selection and admission: the provinces are in 
charge of selection and the federal government is in charge of admission. 
Ultimately, the federal government makes the ¿ nal decision to admit 
based on its discretion as well as its administration of inadmissibility 
requirements.86 The PNP diverges from the other Express Entry categories 
in two respects: in terms of jurisdiction, it permits the provinces to select 
from the Express Entry pool based on the nomination system; and in terms 
of breadth, PNPs operate both within and outside of the Express Entry 
system. For those provincial nominees processed through the Express 
Entry pool, applicants must meet both federal and provincial criteria. 
2. 7KHLQYLWDWLRQVWDJH
Placement in the Express Entry pool marks the beginning of the LQYLWDWLRQ
VWDJH, where the applicant is next ranked according to the Comprehensive 
Ranking System (CRS). At this stage, the CRS points-based system scores 
and ranks candidate pro¿ les out of 1,200 points, employs slightly different 
factors than the original system, and is expressly geared toward generating 
relative rankings of the candidates in the pool. The highest CRS ranking 
applicants are issued LQYLWDWLRQVWRDSSO\. Placement in the Express Entry 
pool marks the beginning of the invitation stage, where the applicant is 
next ranked according to the Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) (see 
Figure 2).
)LJXUH&RPSUHKHQVLYH5DQNLQJ6\VWHP
&RUH+XPDQ&DSLWDO)DFWRUVPD[LPXPRU
Points with spouse or 
common law partner
Points without spouse or 
common law partner
Age 100 110
Education 140 150
Of¿ cial language pro¿ ciency 150 160
Canadian work experience 70 80
7RWDOPD[LPXP 460 500
6SRXVHRU&RPPRQ/DZ3DUWQHU)DFWRUVPD[LPXP
Education 10
Of¿ cial language pro¿ ciency 20
Canadian work experience 10
7RWDOPD[LPXP 40
86. See Report on Plans and Priorities, VXSUD note 76. Also, this mirrors federal paramountcy 
contemplated by s 95. 
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Skill Transferability Factors (maximum 100)
(GXFDWLRQ
Of¿ cial language pro¿ ciency + post-
secondary degree
50
Canadian work experience + post-
secondary degree
50
7RWDOPD[LPXP 50
)RUHLJQZRUNH[SHULHQFH
Of¿ cial language pro¿ ciency + foreign 
work experience
50
Canadian work experience + foreign 
work experience
50
7RWDOPD[LPXP 50
Additional Factors (maximum 600)
Brother or sister living in Canada 
(permanent resident or citizen)
15
French language pro¿ ciency (with poor 
English skills)
15
French language pro¿ ciency (with fair 
English skills)
30
Post-secondary education in Canada 
(1-2 years)
15
Post-secondary education in Canada 
(3+ years)
30
Arranged employment (NOC 00) 200
Arranged employment (NOC 0, A, B) 50
Provincial or territorial nomination 600
7RWDOPD[LPXP 600
The CRS assessment is divided into four categories: core human 
capital factors, spousal factors, skills transferability, and additional factors. 
The “core human capital factors” are contained within the ¿ rst category: 
age, education, language pro¿ ciency, and Canadian work experience. The 
third category, skills transferability, contains the human capital factors 
in various combination such as post-secondary education and language, 
work experience and education, and language and work experience. The 
maximum number of CRS points for the ¿ rst three categories (human 
capital, spousal factors, and skills transferability) is 600 points. These 
¿ rst three categories, sometimes called the “core CRS score,” share some 
features of the regulatory points system to the extent they measure age, 
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language, work experience, and education, but some of those points are 
allocated differently and it is a relative ranking, not an absolute one. 
The most signi¿ cant innovation of the Express Entry system is the 
fourth and ¿ nal category, additional factors, which includes points for the 
job offer or provincial nomination. In its ¿ rst incarnation, a job offer or 
provincial nomination each yielded 600 points on its own. Now, while a 
provincial nomination still nets 600 points, a job offer in the highest level 
National Occupational Classi¿ cation (NOC) 00 (senior management) will 
net 200 points, while a job offer in a NOC 0 (management), A (professional), 
or B (technical and skilled trades) ¿ eld will net 50 points. The CRS points 
allocation for a job offer or provincial nomination signi¿ cantly changes 
the skilled immigration regime, tying it to immediate labour market and 
regional needs and institutionalizing some measure of decision-making 
power for employers and provinces.87 The former points allocation for a 
job offer meant that “quali¿ ed candidates who…have a job offer ZLOO get 
enough points to ensure they are ranked high enough to get an invitation 
to apply.”88 Now, however, though a job offer may tip the balance, it is no 
longer enough to guarantee an invitation.
3. ([SUHVV(QWU\DVDPDWFKPDNLQJV\VWHP
The initial version of Express Entry was touted as a matchmaking system 
because it matched immigration applicants to employers or provinces. 
The pool is designed to be searchable by employers and provinces and 
territories. In the beginning, if applicants did not have a job offer in hand, 
they had to register with the Government of Canada’s Job Bank. This is 
no longer a requirement. To apply for Express Entry, applicants may begin 
the process by either creating their online Express Entry pro¿ le with a job 
offer in hand, or they may create the pro¿ le and hope that an employer pulls 
them from the pool. To apply with a provincial nomination, applicants 
may either apply through a speci¿ c provincial nominee program or create 
an Express Entry pro¿ le, which may be found by provinces and territories 
searching the pool, who will then issue a “noti¿ cation of interest,” urging 
the applicant to apply for their provincial nominee program.89 
87. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, &RPSUHKHQVLYH5DQNLQJ6\VWHP&56&ULWHULD
([SUHVV(QWU\ (Ottawa: IRCC, 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/
services/immigrate-canada/express-entry/eligibility/criteria-comprehensive-ranking-system/grid.
html> [perma.cc/6YZN-PUJ5].
88. The Immigration Times, “Entry Criteria and the Comprehensive Ranking System,” online: 
7KH ,PPLJUDWLRQ 7LPHV <www.theimmigrationtimes.com/canada/345-entry-criteria-and-the-
comprehensive-ranking-system> [perma.cc/3WY4-VMLA] [emphasis added].
89. Lynn Fournier-Ruggles, &DQDGLDQ,PPLJUDWLRQDQG5HIXJHH/DZIRU/HJDO3URIHVVLRQDOV, 4th 
ed (Toronto: Emond, 2018) at 281-284.
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At the invitation stage, IRCC issues invitations to apply to the highest 
ranked candidates according to the CRS system. The old system of 
processing applicants according to their place in the queue is discarded 
in order to “create ef¿ ciencies.”90 IRCC issues invitations in “rounds,” 
with multiple rounds each year. These rounds occur through Ministerial 
Instructions that specify the date and time of the round of invitations, the 
number of candidates who will receive an invitation, and, if applicable, 
the programs included in the round.91 At this point, the relative nature of 
the CRS process becomes apparent. An applicant’s rank in the pool turns 
on which other candidates are in the pool at the time of the round and 
whether the round is general or program-speci¿ c. It is entirely possible 
that a candidate would maintain the same absolute number of CRS points 
(435 points) and not receive an invitation in the ¿ rst round but receive one 
in a subsequent round. 
Those who receive invitations to apply have 90 days to ¿ le their 
online application for permanent residence. The application for permanent 
residence will depend in part on the applicant providing proof of the 
representations they made throughout the Express Entry process, as well 
as on meeting settlement fund and regulatory requirements. One objective 
of Express Entry was to cut processing time from up to 24 months to 
6 months. IRCC undertakes to process permanent residence application 
in six months from ¿ ling, and its report says that it has accomplished 
this timeline in 80% of cases.92 If an invitation to apply is not issued, the 
application will only stay in the Express Entry pool for one year. Applicants 
will exit the Express Entry pool when their pro¿ le expires after one year 
in the pool, when they decline an invitation to apply and do not submit an 
application within the 90-day time limit, when they withdraw their pro¿ le, 
or when their application is submitted for processing.93 
The staging of the points system and regulatory criteria and the CRS 
scoring system suggest that the Express Entry system is rationalized, 
measurable (and thus predictable), and transparent. In part, this is true. 
90. Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, PC 2014-1246, 
(2014) C GAZ II, 2942.
91. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Ministerial Instructions respecting the 
Express Entry system (Ottawa: IRCC, 26 June 2018), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-
refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/ministerial-
instructions/express-entry-application-management-system.html>. For an example of these invitation 
rounds, see: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada; Ministerial Instructions respecting 
invitations to apply for permanent residence under the Express Entry system #118 (Ottawa: IRCC, 29 
May 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/
policies-operational-instructions-agreements/ministerial-instructions.html#toc1>.
92. EE Year-End Report 2015, supra note 72.
93. Ibid.
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Figure 3: Express Entry Application and Selection Process
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calibrate the numbers and qualities of skilled immigrants.97 The room for 
discretion was primarily in the interpretation and application of the points 
criteria. Express Entry, meanwhile, retains that discretion in administering 
the points criteria of the regulatory points system and of the CRS points 
system, and it adds another portal of discretion in its capacity to control the 
parameters of the invitation stage. At this stage, IRCC decides the timing 
of the rounds, the general or speci¿ c nature of the rounds, the pass mark set 
for each round, and the number of invitations issued in a round. In practice, 
the exercise of this discretion has meant that the rounds do not reach very 
deep into the pool.  In both the old and new systems, immigration of¿ cers 
have the discretion to substitute their evaluation for skilled worker points 
criteria regarding the likelihood to “become economically established in 
Canada.”98 
In its ¿ rst incarnation, with both job offers and provincial nominations 
worth 600 CRS points, the Express Entry system was a clear shift toward 
the market-oriented, demand-driven model of economic immigration.99
The 600 points directly tied employers and provinces and territories to 
immigration selection results. The outcome, acknowledged in an IRCC 
report, was that candidates with low core CRS scores but a job offer or 
nomination in hand shot to the top of the rankings, past candidates higher 
core CRS scores but without a job offer or provincial nomination.100 Since 
the reweighting of the job offer in 2016, however, Express Entry seems to 
be more of hybrid model, maintaining the human capital factors in both 
the regulatory points system required to enter the pool and in the CRS 
points system required to receive an invitation to apply, while creating 
institutionalized space for employers and provinces and territories to ¿ ll 
labour market needs.101 However, this picture is further complicated by 
the move to two-step immigration in Canada. This move multiplied the 
nodes of transition for temporary workers to become permanent residents 
through programs such as CEC. Express Entry internalized this policy 
preference by allocating CRS points for Canadian work experience, post-
secondary education in Canada, and a job offer. Here, if an applicant is 
already present in Canada as a worker or a student, s/he can maximize her 
97. See ,535VXSUD note 43, s 76(2).
98. ,ELG, s 76(3).
99. Koslowski, VXSUD note 15.
100. EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72 (two-thirds of invited candidates with job offers had 
core CRS scores of 300 or less).
101. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ([SUHVV (QWU\ ,PSURYHPHQWV )DOO , 
(Ottawa: IRCC, 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2016/11/
express-entry-improvements-fall-2016.html> [https://perma.cc/FF5K-Q5RW].
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CRS points without needing to accumulate as many human capital points. 
For example, an applicant with two years of post-secondary education, one 
year of work experience, and the lowest accepted pro¿ ciency in an of¿ cial 
language could nonetheless pass the regulatory points threshold with a job 
offer (weighted twice, in arranged employment and adaptability). Then, 
at the CRS stage, that same applicant would bene¿ t from Canadian work 
experience in the ¿ rst and third categories and a job offer in the fourth 
category. Without the Canadian work experience s/he garnered in the 
temporary stream, it is unlikely that the applicant would have received a 
job offer, both factors which can be counted in Express Entry.
Applying the disaggregated neo-corporatist criteria, the shift toward 
the neo-corporatist model is visible. It is still the immigrant who triggers 
the immigration process by creating an online pro¿ le, but other vectors 
have shifted. In cases where the employer or province or territory is 
willing to vouch for the immigrant through a job offer or a nomination, 
they effectively pull the applicant out of the pool. This is most clearly the 
case for provinces and territories, who can bestow applicants with 600 
points, and it is at least partly the case for employers, who can bestow 
applicants with 50 or 200 points, depending on the skill classi¿ cation 
of the job. Moreover, the regulatory selection criteria are revised in the 
CRS and reweighted in alignment with the labour market factors. These 
selection criteria are set by the federal government, although they build 
in provincial and territorial selection delegation, and they are adjusted in 
response to input from various interests, including business interests.102
III. The deeper changes wrought by Express Entry
1. A shift in legal instrument: Ministerial Instructions and the 
lawmaking process
The IRPA is framework legislation. This means that it does not prescribe 
detailed programs and procedures, leaving those details to the regulations. 
Regulations are legally binding.103 They must be authorized by statute: 
102. See Canadian Chamber of Commerce, “Immigration for a Competitive Canada: Why Highly 
Skilled International Talent Is at Risk” (The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, January 2016), online 
(pdf): <www.chamber.ca/download.aspx?t=0&pid=f6479846-2dba-e511-bb93-005056a00b05> 
[perma.cc/C236-MALJ] [Canadian Chamber of Commerce]. The report calls for an end to the Labour 
Market Impact Assessment requirement for job offers and then note November 2016 changes to 
job offer requirements, removing the LMIA requirement for some categories of workers already in 
Canada. 
103. Andrew Green, “Delegation and Consultation: How the Administrative State Functions and the 
Importance of Rules” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed 
(Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2017) 307 at 309; John Mark Keyes, Executive Legislation, 2nd ed 
(Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2010) at 35.
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section 5(1) of the IRPA delegates to the Governor-in-Council the 
authority to make regulations about matters contained in or referred to in 
the Act. Regulation making is a rigorous process that involves multiple 
steps before regulations are realized. Some immigration regulations are 
subjected to an additional layer of parliamentary scrutiny. They must be 
tabled in the Senate and House of Commons and referred to their respective 
committees.104 The entire Express Entry regime was promulgated under 
Ministerial Instructions and continues to run biweekly draws under 
their guise. Ministerial Instructions, however, are not regulations. They 
are not even statutory instruments.105 This section explores the nature of 
Ministerial Instructions, their democratic shortcomings, and the genealogy 
of their rise to prominence.
The nature of Ministerial Instructions is unclear. The provenance of 
Ministerial Instructions in the immigration context suggests their initial 
character as soft law. Section 93 of the IRPA refers to guidelines and 
instructions in the same breath, presumably as similar types of soft law 
instruments. Soft law is not “directly legally binding” and includes policies 
and guidelines.106 It permits À exibility and speed.107 And yet the the Express 
Entry regime does not resemble these soft law categories in either form or 
function. Unlike guidelines, Ministerial Instructions do not assist decision-
makers in their application of legal criteria, contained in the statute or 
regulations, to individuals.108 Instead, they establish that legal criteria. 
They seem rather akin to the “guideline” invalidated by the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission, 
where Doherty J. noted that the instrument set out “a minutely detailed 
regime that reads like a statute or regulation.”109 Ministerial Instructions 
under the IRPA are like statutory and regulatory instruments without any 
of the usual baggage of democratic lawmaking.110 They immediately have 
the force of law, but they do not require advance notice, consultation, or 
104. See, e.g., IRPA, supra note 57, ss 17, 32, 53, 61, 87.2, 102, 116, 150, 150(1). See also Canada, 
Immigration Policy Primer, by Sandra Elgersma, Pub No 2015-42-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 
16 Nov 2015), online (pdf): <lop.parl.ca/static¿ les/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/
InBriefs/PDF/2015-42-e.pdf > [perma.cc/P8KF-BPN4] [Elgersma].
105. See IRPA, supra note 57, s 93.
106.  See Green, supra note 103 at 310.
107. Ibid at 311-313.
108. See Lorne Sossin & Charles W Smith, “Hard Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy 
Guidelines and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government” (2003) 40 Alb L Rev 867 at 868-869 
(for a description of ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’).
109. Ainsley Financial Corp. v Ontario Securities Commission, (1994) 121 DLR (4th) 79, at para 19, 
21 OR (3d) 104.
110. See IRPA, supra note 57, s 9 (Ministerial Instructions are not statutory instruments for the 
purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act).
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analysis.111 There is no requirement of pre-publication and no discussion in 
the broader public sphere with interested parties. Audrey Macklin explains:
Ministerial Instructions are a peculiar instrument. They seem not to 
constitute law in the way that is conventionally understood. They do not 
exist under the Statutory Instruments Act; they are speci¿ cally exempted 
from it. They appear to give the minister the authority to make law by 
decree.112
There are several limits built into the regulatory process to protect 
democratic lawmaking that do not apply to Ministerial Instructions. In the 
IRPA, the regulation-making power is delegated from the legislature to the 
Cabinet through the Governor-in-Council. The resulting regulations are 
delegated—or subordinate—legislation, considered inferior to statutes. 113
Their raison d’être is to allow those who implement the statute to adjust 
the rules over time to take account of new or unforeseen circumstances 
or changes in policy direction. Although regulations do not always or 
necessarily require notice or consultation, by virtue of both the Statutory 
Instruments Act and the Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management, 
they are pre-published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, subjected to analysis 
in a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS), commented upon, 
revised, approved by the Governor-in-Council, and ¿ nally published in 
the Canada Gazette, Part II.114 
By contrast, Ministerial Instructions must be published on the IRCC 
website, and a subset of them must also be published in the Canada 
Gazette.115 Neither of these publication requirements permits comment, 
revision, or effective oversight. Macklin identi¿ es the larger concern this 
raises: the ability of Ministerial Instructions—themselves not law—to 
overrule prior law.116 To date, Ministerial Instructions have been used to 
triage and revise application criteria, terminate applications, and suspend 
some immigration classes while creating new ones. In effect, these 
111. See Sharryn J Aiken et al, eds, Immigration & Refugee Law: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, 
2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 178; IRPA, supra note 57, s 2(2) (force of law).
112. Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 41st Parl, 
1st Sess, No 12 (20 February 2012) at 12:47 (Audrey Macklin), online (pdf): <sencanada.ca/Content/
SEN/Committee/411/LCJC/pdf/12issue.pdf> [perma.cc/7Q5U-ETA3] [Standing Committee].
113. See Craig Forcese et al, eds, Public Law: Cases, Commentary, and Analysis, 3rd ed (Toronto: 
Edmond Montgomery, 2015) at 299.
114. Ibid at 301; Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Guide to the Federal Regulatory Development 
Process (Ottawa: TBCS, 17 April 2014), online: <www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/
services/federal-regulatory-management/guidelines-tools/guide-federal-regulatory-development-
process.html> [perma.cc/Z8G2-HYCU].  
115. IRPA, supra note 57, ss 10(3), (4).
116. See Standing Committee, supra note 112 at 12:60, 12:49, 12:58 (Audrey Macklin). 
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instructions eviscerate prior legal entitlements and “even overrule what the 
act and regulations state as a matter of law.”117 Effectively, the IRPA and 
its regulations are revised and overruled through Ministerial Instructions, 
which are not subject to public scrutiny, Parliamentary accountability, or 
procedural formality safeguards.118 
By using soft law instructions as regulatory (or even statutory) 
creatures, the federal government avoided any advisory or public 
participation in regime changes.119 One result of the categorical division 
between soft law and regulations is that it ensures impact analysis and 
notice and consultation procedures for regulatory changes. By amending 
legislation under the guise of a guideline-type instrument, Ministerial 
Instructions curtail democratic dialogue as much as institutional dialogue. 
Where proposed statutory amendments or regulations are authorized by the 
Governor-in-Council, they would be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, 
thus ensuring a check on executive lawmaking. The use of Ministerial 
Instructions shifts the locus of immigration lawmaking authority, placing 
it in the hands of individual Cabinet ministers.120 In a Standing Senate 
Committee discussion about the use of Ministerial Instructions to make 
law, Senator Fraser agreed that “[t]hat is particularly interesting to 
parliamentarians because Parliament does have the right to scrutinize 
and indeed overturn regulations, but not Ministerial Instructions. It is 
fascinating.”121 The characterization of Ministerial Instructions as non-
statutory instruments should raise concerns, not only about the enhanced 
authority of the executive, but also about the result: entire divisions of 
immigration law have been changed outside of the generally accepted 
lawmaking process.
The genealogy of the appearance of Ministerial Instructions in the 
IRPA is informative. The IRPA now contains ten substantive mentions 
of Ministerial Instructions: seven subject provisions that authorize the 
Minister to issue instructions and three provisions about the nature and 
117. Ibid at 12:49 (Audrey Macklin). 
118. See Sossin & Smith, supra note 108 at 887. There are some safeguards built in the IRPA provisions 
governing business immigrants in section 14.1, including a cap of 2,750 per year and a 5-year time 
limit, but these provisions pertain to a small sub-category of business immigrants (formerly, investors, 
entrepreneurs, and self-employed persons; now start-up visa holders and self-employed persons). The 
investor pilot program has been discontinued, and the start-up visa program has been moved into the 
regulations (see IRPA, supra note 57, ss 98.01-98.09).
119. France Houle & Geneviève Saint-Laurent, “Privatisations du processus de selection au Canada: 
retour vers des pratiques discriminatoires” in Adèle Garnier, Loïc Pignolo & Geneviève Saint-Laurent, 
eds, Gèrer les migrations face aux dé¿ s identitaires et sécuritaires (Genève: Université de Genève: 
2018) 13 at 20-21. 
120. See Carver, supra note 67 at 224.
121. Standing Committee, supra note 112 at 12:50 (Senator Fraser).
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character of instructions.122 Tracing the amendments related to Ministerial 
Instructions reveals a government concertedly creating a less cumbersome 
regulatory power. While the form or modality of Ministerial Instructions 
is not new, the scale and depth of their deployment since 2008 deserves 
scrutiny. As noted above, the concept of and authority for Ministerial 
Instructions existed in the original promulgation of the IRPA. Section 93 
stated that: 
Instructions given by the Minister or the Minister of Employment 
and Social Development under this Act and guidelines issued by the 
Chairperson under paragraph 159(1)(h) are not statutory instruments for 
the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act.123
The use of such instructions was contemplated in three early, discrete 
provisions related to family sponsorship, examinations, and temporary 
resident permits.124 These three provisions simply required of¿ cers to 
apply regulations in accordance with any such instructions. Based on these 
early provisions, it seems likely that instructions were intended to be used 
and considered in a similar manner to guidelines.125 Guidelines, however, 
are not law; they are interpretative guides for immigration of¿ cers, but 
they are not binding.126 As Peter Carver notes, “[i]n form, Ministerial 
Instructions have the appearance of guidelines, principally in that they are 
addressed to civil servants, not to the public generally, and describe how 
applications are to be processed, a seemingly internal concern.”127
In the years subsequent, the government changed the architecture of the 
IRPA through Ministerial Instructions and turned them into different legal 
animals. On the one hand, the government amended the IRPA to add more 
weight to the burgeoning regime of Ministerial Instructions. It enacted 
section 94(2), requiring speci¿ c reporting for Ministerial Instructions in 
the annual report to Parliament and section 2(2) which rede¿ ned “this 
122. IRPA, supra note 57, ss 10.3, 13(4), 14.1, 15(4), 24(3), 30, 87.3(3) (authorizing Ministerial 
Instructions), and ss 2(2), 93, 94(2) (referring to the nature and character of Ministerial Instructions).
123. Ibid, s 93.
124. See IRPA, supra note 57, ss 13(4) (sponsorship), 15(4) (examinations), 24(3) (temporary resident 
permits).
125. See, e.g., ibid, s 93 (where “instructions” appear with “guidelines” to mean non-statutory 
instruments).
126. See Baker v Canada, [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 72, 174 DLR (4th) 193 (“the guidelines are a 
useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the power conferred by the section”), 
af¿ rmed in Agraira v Canada, 2013 SCC 36 at para 85. See also Kanthasamy v Canada, 2015 SCC 61 
at para 32.
127. Carver, supra note 67 at 226.
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Act” to include “regulations and instructions under s. 14.1(1).”128 This 
latter rede¿ nition in 2012, in particular, merged Ministerial Instructions 
about business immigration (promulgated under section 14.1) into the 
Act, effectively making them part of the statute. On the other hand, the 
government set about drafting and publishing Ministerial Instructions 
to change the processing criteria and eligibility classes for economic 
immigrants, ¿ rst amending the statute to establish the authority to do 
so, then passing a raft of instructions. Through new sections 10.3, 14.1, 
30(1.2), and 87.3 of the IRPA, the foundation was laid to categorically 
rewrite economic immigration. 
The initial Ministerial Instructions, aimed at clearing the backlog 
of federal skilled worker applications, turned out to be the harbinger. 
Section 87.3 set the ambit of Ministerial Instructions broadly so long as 
they furthered the purpose of “best support[ing] the attainment of the 
immigration goals established by the Government of Canada.”129 Under 
this ambit, the government paused, narrowed, and capped both federal 
skilled worker and parental sponsorship applications. These Ministerial 
Instructions were the ¿ rst to be tested in the courts and withstood judicial 
scrutiny,130 revealing one remarkable feature of the newly minted statutory 
authority to issue such instructions: the government’s express effort to 
insulate decisions made under section 87.3 from judicial review.131 This 
preclusion of judicial review added yet another layer to the democratic 
de¿ cit of Ministerial Instructions, revealing their ability to characterize 
decisions made under their authority as unreviewable: “the fact that an 
application is retained, returned or otherwise disposed of does not constitute 
a decision not to issue the visa or other document, or grant the status or 
exemption, in relation to which the application or request is made.”132 
Following quickly on the heels of the federal skilled worker culling, 
the Minister eliminated two business classes and created two new ones, 
rewrote the points system into the Express Entry regime, and added public 
128. Section 14.1 refers to the Express Entry regime; section 94(2) was enacted 2008-06-18; section 
2(2) was enacted 2012-06-29; plus s 92(1.1) said that an instruction may incorporate any material 
regardless of source (2012-06-29).
129. IRPA, supra note 57, s 87.3(2),(3)
130. See Liang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2012 FC 758; Esensoy v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2012 FC 1343; Lukaj v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & 
Immigration), 2013 FC 8.
131. See IRPA, supra note 57, s 87.3(5); Mario Bellissimo, “Law-Making Innovation in the Canadian 
and International Immigration Context” (3 May 2013) at 1, online (pdf): Canadian Bar Association 
<www.cba.org/CBA/cle/PDF/IMM13_paper_bellissimo.pdf> [perma.cc/3PY6-EG3P].
132. IRPA, supra note 57, s 87.3(5).
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allocations from the regulations. Now, the process of issuing rounds of 
invitation under Ministerial Instructions reduces the ability to review 
those interpretations. In other words, while the Express Entry instructions 
are not expressly shielded from review, their nature means that the points 
of discretionary decision making are more dif¿ cult to locate and judicially 
review.
Although Ministerial Instructions may be troubling from the 
perspectives of democracy and the rule of law, they nonetheless ¿ t into a 
longer narrative about “the systematic submersion of the migration regime 
beneath the source of legislative text, down to less accessible regulatory 
subtext and ultimately to low visibility discretionary counter-text…”137
Historically, large portions of Canada’s racist immigration laws were 
made “in the form of ‘orders-in-council,’ legal declarations of the cabinet 
approved by the Governor General” speci¿ cally to maintain À exibility, 
discretion, and to avoid controversy.138 In terms of the relationship between 
economy and community that animates immigration law, Ministerial 
Instructions reveal the troubling use of intended soft law instruments for 
decidedly hard law purposes, thus shortcircuiting the very community that 
immigration law tried to build through the points system. For now, Express 
Entry changes who may be admitted to the economy and the community 
without any public scrutiny of who should enter or on what terms. 
2. A shift in decision maker: third parties and selection authority
The Express Entry regime changes who is in charge of selecting economic 
immigrants. The human capital model had placed the federal government 
in charge of selection. Under that model, the role of the state in border 
control and immigration generally was thus coincident with the state’s 
role in economic immigration. The philosophy of the human capital 
model was premised on long-term, broad-based skills and À exibility.139
The regulatory points system weighted the job offer as part of the calculus, 
but it was not primarily concerned with meeting immediate labour market 
or regional needs into its processes. Express Entry effectively channels 
labour market needs through employers and provinces and territories, 
granting them some measure of selection authority. This is more obvious 
137. Audrey Macklin, “Historicizing Narratives of Arrival” in Hester Lessard, Rebecca Johnson & 
Jeremy Webber, eds, Storied Communities (Seattle: University of Washington Press: 2010) at 52.
138. See Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin,  supra note 3 chapter on Canada at 147-148, 176. For example, 
the ban on “any immigrant of any Asiatic race” and discriminatory naturalization requirements were 
contained in Orders in Council. See Regulations re landing in Canada of Asiatics, OIC 1923-0182, 
(1923) RG2 A-1-d, 2819; PC 1378 of 17 June 1931, respectively. The continuous journey requirement 
was also contained in an Order in Council, see PC 24 of 7 January 1914.
139. See Abu-Laban & Gabriel, supra note 54 at 80.
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with nominations, which virtually guarantee an invitation to apply, but it is 
also true of job offers, especially those for senior management occupations, 
which will tip the balance. The Express Entry model shifts economic 
immigration in Canada toward the neo-corporatist model. This is a shift 
not only in who receives invitations to apply based on labour market 
factors, but also a shift in values and priorities. The neo-corporatist model 
is looking for fully-formed, labour market ready immigrants.140 What is 
lost is sustained attention to the capacity to adapt to new environments and 
other characteristics which facilitate broad-based integration. Indeed, one 
potential problem with this delegation is that third parties may not be as 
concerned with broader settlement and integration issues. 141 
a. 7KHYLHZIURPWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUHPSOR\HUV
In the Express Entry system, the maximum core CRS score (for the ¿ rst three 
categories) is 600 points. Under the regulatory points system, applicants 
receive a maximum of 15 points for arranged employment. Under the 
initial Express Entry system, applicants received 600 CRS points for a 
job offer, which was generally suf¿ cient to trigger an invitation to apply 
for permanent residence. This effectively removed state discretion with 
respect to those applications, making the CRS core human capital points 
score irrelevant, and delegated selection to the private sector.142 Under the 
current Express Entry system, applicants receive 200 CRS points for a 
job offer in NOC 00 ¿ elds (senior management), and 50 CRS points for a 
job offer in NOC 0, A, or B ¿ elds (management, professional, and skilled 
occupations).143 The 2016 modi¿ cations have signi¿ cantly attenuated the 
role of employer interests and job offers in the Express Entry system. 
The rationale behind the early allocation of 600 points was to “ensure 
employers’ needs are met.” 144 IRCC explained:
Express Entry facilitates a more direct employer role in the immigration 
process. Employers may connect with foreign nationals through 
recruitment techniques such as private job boards, recruiters, or job fairs 
and they can give candidates a job offer that will elevate a candidate’s 
ranking.145 
140. See, e.g., Mary Crock, “Contract or Compact: Skilled Migration and the Dictates of Politics and 
Ideology” (2001) 16:1 Georgetown Immigration LJ 133 (describing the Australian system).
141. Note that Manitoba and British Columbia had settlement responsibilities until the federal 
government took them back in 2010.  Quebec is the only province that is still responsible for settlement 
services.  See Mireille Paquet, “The Federalization of Immigration and Integration in Canada” (2014) 
47:3 Can J Political Science 519. See also Davide Strazzari, “Immigration and Federalism in Canada: 
beyond Quebec Exceptionalism” (2017) 9:3 Perspectives on Federalism 56 at E-71.
142. Houle & Saint-Laurent, VXSUD note 119 at 23.
143. As of 19 November 2016. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12. 
144. EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72; EE Q & A, VXSUD note 73.
145. EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 12.
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In most cases, employers had to obtain a Labour Market Impact Assessment
(LMIA) indicating that there are no Canadian citizens or permanent 
residents available for the job.146 This hurdle was particularly challenging 
in the initial phase when the aim of Express Entry was to directly ¿ ll 
labour market needs by giving employers 600 points for the extension of 
a job offer. The bargain struck by Express Entry was that employers could 
use the portal to hire job candidates because they would be approved and 
admitted within six months. The LMIA process added many months of 
processing in an express system designed to ¿ ll immediate labour market 
needs. In 2016, the government removed the LMIA requirement for some 
categories of workers already in Canada, but the requirement is still 
subject to general criticism “because its logic is based on the protection of 
certain temporary jobs….It is not designed to measure long-term labour 
demand.”147
In 2015, the total number of invitations to apply for permanent 
residence was 31,063, and 60% of the applicants invited to apply for 
permanent residence had CRS scores above 600 points.148 Those applicants 
necessarily relied on either a job offer or a provincial nomination to obtain 
scores above 600. Indeed, ¿ ve of the 23 rounds of invitations pulled only 
applicants with CRS scores above 600 points. This was a signi¿ cant 
amount of the total number of economic permanent residents, and it meant 
that the employer or province could signi¿ cantly tilt the balance where the 
applicant has a low “core CRS score” with few human capital attributes. 
The effects of the 600 point allocations were visible in the occupational 
spread of the ¿ rst cohort of invitees: the largest group of invited candidates 
were food service supervisors and cooks (NOC 63)—likely to have lower 
core CRS scores coupled with valid job offers—followed by information 
technology professionals (NOC 21).149 A signi¿ cant number of these 
applicants were already in Canada on a temporary basis.150 In these 
early days, Express Entry was pulling more lower skilled workers than 
the former points system because of the 600 points for job offers and 
provincial nominations, combined with the ability to maximize points for 
146. This opinion is rendered by Employment and Social Development Canada.
147. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ([SUHVV(QWU\(DUO\2EVHUYDWLRQVRQ1RYHPEHU
 ,PSURYHPHQWV (Ottawa: IRCC, 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/express-entry-early-observations-november-2016.html> 
[perma.cc/AUH4-W9N6]. Canadian Chamber of Commerce, VXSUD note 102 at 8.
148. See EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72.
149. ,ELG
150. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “2018 Annual Report to Parliament on 
Immigration” (Ottawa: IRCC, 2019) at 15, online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/
ircc/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2018.pdf> [perma.cc/QGE6-964H].
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applicants already in Canada, who could garner points for Canadian work 
experience.
For 2016, IRCC disaggregated the numbers: applicants with job offers 
made up 34% of the annual extended invitations, and provincial nominees 
made up 26% of invitations to apply.  The total number of invitations 
remained low at 33,782.151 The top two occupations reversed in 2016: 
candidates working as information technology professionals (NOC 21) 
were the largest group of invited candidates, followed by cooks and food 
service supervisors (NOC 63). Over the course of that year, the invitation 
rounds began to pull candidates in NOC 11, 21, and 40 (professionals 
and professors), evidencing a shift toward higher skilled workers.152 This 
trend deepened further with the reduction of CRS points for a job offer in 
November of that year. In 2017, applicants with job offers made up 9% of 
invitees, while provincial nominees made up 10%, out of a much larger 
total of 86,022 invitations to apply.153 The occupational mix remained 
stable, with information technology professionals (NOC 21) making the 
largest three groups of invited candidates.
In terms of the distribution of source countries, in 2015, the top six 
countries of citizenship were: India, Philippines, China, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and the United States. In 2016, the top six countries remained 
the same but shifted spots.154 In 2017, the Philippines and Ireland fell 
out of the top six, replaced by Nigeria and Pakistan.155 Perhaps most 
signi¿ cantly, the main country of residence for invited candidates in all 
three years was Canada because of the high numbers of temporary foreign 
workers and students who wished to settle permanently.156 This con¿ rms 
the advantages enjoyed by candidates who are already in Canada. Instead 
of their assessment resting on raw language or education criteria, a large 
part of it shifts to the short-term assessment of whether the candidate is 
already plugged into the Canadian economy.
The CRS threshold has evened out over time, coming to settle 
between 450-500.157 Although the reweighting of the job offer reduces 
the role of the labour market in the Express Entry system, it continues 
151. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 9.
152. ,ELG at 13.
153. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Express Entry Year-End Report 2017” 
(Ottawa: IRCC, 2018), online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/documents/pdf/english/pub/
express-entry-year-end-report-2017.pdf> [perma.cc/NF52-H3DP] [EE Year-End Report 2017].
154. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 14.
155. See EE Year-End Report 2017, VXSUD note 153 at 13.
156. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 14.
157. See LELG A review of the 2017 rounds of invitations shows that they converge around 430 CRS 
points, with exceptions for PNP or FST only rounds.
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to permeate selection. Provincial nominee programs internalize labour 
market functions since they often extend nominations based on job offers 
or regional labour market needs. There are two potential concerns with 
this kind of delegation, especially when it is heavily weighted. The state is 
tasked with the full gamut of objectives in the IRPA, from protecting rights 
to reunifying families.158 One concern is the potentially divergent interests 
of employers and/or provinces and territories and the federal government. 
As Naomi Alboim explains: “Provinces, employers, universities and 
colleges do not have the national interest as their mandate or objective…. 
[They are not] in the business of selecting individuals based on their long-
term potential to contribute to Canada as citizens.”159 This meshes with the 
analysis, above, about what is captured by the human capital metric. The 
other concern is about private sector discrimination in selection. France 
Houle and Geneviève Saint-Laurent worry that employers will prefer to 
hire immigrants with familiar educational credentials and work experience, 
leading to the exclusion of immigrants from the Global South.160 This 
concern that delegated interests may not adhere to established standards 
of equal treatment and may become “laboratories of bigotry” is echoed in 
immigration federalism scholarship about the limited appeal options for 
refused provincial and territorial nominees.161
b. The view from federalism: provinces and territories
The place of provinces and territories in Express Entry contemplates their 
unique constitutional and historical role in immigration matters. Under the 
1867 Constitution Act, immigration is a concurrent jurisdiction subject to 
federal paramountcy.162 Despite their role in immigration as colonies, the 
provinces were generally content to let the federal government take the reins 
after Confederation, with mild interruptions in this jurisdictional stasis.163
Quebec revived immigration federalism in the 1960s with its claims for 
recognition as a distinct society, which led to the conclusion of several 
158. IRPA, supra note 57, s 3.
159. Naomi Albiom, Adjusting the Balance: Fixing Canada’s Economic Immigration Policies
(Toronto: Maytree Foundation, 2012) at 50.
160. Houle & Saint-Laurent, supra note 119 at 22-26.
161. Sasha Baglay & Delphine Nakache, eds, Immigration Regulation in Federal States: Challenges 
and Responses in Comparative Perspective (New York: Springer Publishing, 2014) at 7. 
162. Constitution Act, supra note 85, s 9 (see also s 91(25): “Naturalization of Aliens”). 
163. See Strazzari, supra note 141 at 63-64, noting that this reign was interrupted by British 
Columbia’s anti-Chinese immigration laws at the turn of the century.
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intergovernmental agreements about immigration.164 This eventually 
precipitated provincial demand for immigration jurisdiction-sharing 
agreements. In the mid-1990s, the federal government developed the PNP 
to allow other provinces and territories to identify permanent resident 
nominees using their own selection criteria. 165 PNPs allow the provinces to 
identify limited numbers of economic immigrants, thereby preserving more 
federal control than under the arrangement with Quebec.166 Between 1998 
and 2009, every province and territory except Nunavut signed a provincial 
nominee agreement.167 In the last two decades, immigration has been 
rapidly decentralized with provincial and territorial authorities exercising 
signi¿ cant decision-making power in the selection of immigrants, in line 
with trends in several other federal states. 168
The division of responsibilities lies along selection and inadmissibility 
lines: the provincial governments are responsible for designing PNP 
streams and criteria as well as recruiting, selecting, and nominating 
immigrants.169 The federal government has the ¿ nal say in the selection of 
nominees and is responsible for inadmissibility screening.170 The federal 
government also has authority to cap the PNP numbers as it sees ¿ t.171
The provincial and territorial roles in immigration selection mirror the 
rationales for federalism more generally. Immigration selection allows 
sub-state actors to prioritize their local autonomy and identity, to meet local 
economic needs, and to enjoy the bene¿ ts of subsidiarity. The objectives 
of these PNP agreements are to address regional particularities and diverse 
economic and demographic needs and to manage particular newcomer 
settlement patterns. For example, Quebec criteria favours French speaking 
164. See Lang-Cloutier Agreement (1971); Andras-Bienvenue Agreement (1975), Cullen-Couture 
Agreement (1978), Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of 
Aliens (February 5, 1991); Paquet, supra note 141 at 530 (discussing the Gagnon-Tremblay-McDougall 
agreement). Note that these are not, strictly speaking, provincial nomination agreements. Quebec’s 
accords are broader in scope and jurisdiction (selection, reception, integration), and references to them 
appear separately in the IRPA. 
165. See F Leslie Seidle, “Canada’s Provincial Nominee Immigration Programs: Securing Greater 
Policy Alignment” (2013) 43 IRPP Study at 5.
166. See Keith Banting, “Remaking Immigration: Asymmetric Decentralization and Canadian 
Federalism” in Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, eds, Canadian Federalism: Performance, 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy, 3rd ed (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2012)  261; Paquet, supra 
note 141 at 529-532.
167. See Seidle, supra note 165 at 5; note: QC is under a different non-PNP arrangement.
168. See Banting, supra note 166; See Baglay & Nakache, supra note 161 at 3-7.
169. See Seidle, supra note 165.
170. The ¿ nal decision rests with the federal’s government’s ability to assess a provincial nominee’s 
ability to become economically established: see IRPR, supra note 43, ss 87(3),(4).
171. See Banting, supra note 166. 
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immigrants, while Manitoba’s criteria favours semi-skilled trades.172 These 
objectives redouble on each other: when provinces select immigrants 
based on regional labour market needs, they are indirectly injecting labour 
market factors into the Express Entry calculus. 
The provincial nominee programs are now the second largest source of 
economic immigration to Canada.173 In 2015, provincial nominations made 
up 13% of the applicants invited for permanent residence under Express 
Entry.174 In 2016, provincial nominations totaled 26% of invitations.175
One of the ways applicants can apply to be considered for the PNPs is 
through the online Express Entry system, which typically refers back to 
the base Express Entry categories and requires that applicants ¿ t within 
one of them. Eligibility for Express Entry, in other words, functions as 
a kind of À oor for provincial selection. For example, British Columbia 
and Ontario tell potential immigrants that they must qualify for a federal 
immigration program, and then the provinces apply their own criteria to 
select nominees from the Express Entry pool.176 In short, PNPs are both 
broader than Express Entry—covering immigrants not included in the 
Express Entry categories—and narrower than Express Entry, requiring 
immigrants to ¿ t within the Express Entry categories and then further 
winnowing the pool from there. It depends on the  application stream. 
This means that the PNP category in the Express Entry system is not 
an independent provincial category but rather a jurisdictional amalgam: 
the federal government sets the minimum requirements, the provinces 
make the ultimate selection decisions under the PNP category, and then 
the federal government processes the PNP applications for admissibility. 
This is different from other, non-Express Entry PNP categories, for which 
the federal government does not set selection criteria and which function 
internally to the province. 
In terms of the historical arc, Express Entry is part of a return to 
fuller jurisdictional concurrency. A decade after the creation of the PNPs 
172.  See Sasha Baglay,“Provincial Nominee Programs: A Note on Policy Implications and Future 
Research Needs” (2012) 13 Int’l Migration and Integration 121 at 122, 127-129.
173. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, )DFW6KHHW3URYLQFLDO1RPLQHH3URJUDP (Ottawa: 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, February 2012), online (pdf): <www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/
pnp-pcp-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/337K-X3LF]. It is important to note that initial PNP uptake is partially 
attributable to historically long backlogs for federal skilled worker applications. 
174. See EE Year-End Report 2015, VXSUD note 72.
175. See EE Year-End Report 2016, VXSUD note 12 at 9.
176. See BC PNP: <www.welcomebc.ca/Immigrate-to-B-C/B-C-Provincial-Nominee-Program/
BC-PNP-pathways> [perma.cc/R648-HZS5]; ON PNP: <www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-immigrant-
nominee-program-oinp> [perma.cc/6XM3-38PX]. See also AB PNP: <www.alberta.ca/ainp-selection-
criteria.aspx#toc-2> [perma.cc/HPJ6-UTAN]; NS PNP: <novascotiaimmigration.com/move-here/
nova-scotia-demand-express-entry/> [perma.cc/6ZVQ-F8KW].
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in the mid-1990s, the federal government pulled back from devolving 
immigration powers to the provinces. In her 2009 report, the Auditor-
General noted that the lack of a common policy framework required 
attention and that “[a]t the time of our audit, [PNPs] included more than 50 
different categories, each with its own selection approach and criteria.”177
The federal government shared these fragmentation concerns—different 
selection criteria, different provincial identities, different relationships to 
the federal state, and different settlement and integration infrastructure 
as well as numbers.178 That year, the federal government had become so 
concerned about PNP growth that it capped provincial nominee numbers, 
introduced some minimum requirements, and urged the provinces to align 
their programs to national purposes.179 It also removed responsibility for 
settlement services in 2010 from the two provinces that had taken them 
over: British Columbia and Manitoba.180 F. Leslie Seidle refers to this as 
the “reassertion of the federal role.”181 
Although policy coherence and ef¿ ciency concerns continue to dog 
PNPs, the federal government seems willing to work those out from within 
a deepening model of concurrency.182 With the advent of Express Entry 
in 2015, the federal government institutionalized provincial selection in 
a federal system.  A provincial nomination is now the only attribute that 
will garner an economic applicant 600 points in the CRS ranking system. 
This makes federalism—and immigration’s role within it—the last trump 
in the Express Entry regime. Properly understood, then, the 600 points 
granted to provincial nominees under Express Entry institutionalizes the 
concurrent jurisdiction contemplated by section 95 of the Constitution Act 
and sections 8 and 9 of the IRPA; it ensures that provincial selection will 
govern.
There are general concerns about third party selection authority that 
apply to PNPs, as well as more speci¿ c ones. Mireille Paquet notes: 
“[a]s a mechanism centred on the economy and demography, province 
building in immigration is not concerned with belonging or identity, as 
is nation building.”183 This indirectly raises a higher order concern about 
177. Canada, Auditor General Report, 2009 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa: 
Of¿ ce of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009), c 2. 
178. See Elgersma, supra note 104 at 5. The number of immigrants entering Canada under these 
programs rose from 2.7% in 2004 to 18.3% in 2014.
179. See Paquet, supra note 141 at 540; Seidle, supra note 165 at 7; Banting, supra note 166.
180. See Strazzari, supra note 141 at 72.
181. Seidle, supra note 165 at 18.
182. Baglay & Nakache, supra note 161 at 7.
183. Paquet, supra note 141 at 527, citing JJ Linz, “State Building and Nation Building” (1993) 1 
European Review 355.
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whether immigration subsidiarity can work in Canada. From selection 
concerns about whether PNPs can pick adaptable, economic immigrants 
to settlement concerns about whether provinces can keep nominees in the 
province and provide the necessary integration infrastructure, the issues 
multiply almost as quickly as the streams of entry. These concerns are 
real, and the federal government may choose to introduce some baseline 
criteria.  However, with Express Entry, the federal government is implicitly 
accepting the messy and diverse outcomes of immigration federalism as 
part of the larger iterative federal project. As Seidle notes, “[a]lthough 
the concept of immigration federalism includes elements of competitive 
federalism, it also entails cooperation to achieve shared policy goals.”184
In a federation marked by cooperative federalism where the constitutional 
division of powers divides jurisdiction in order to allocate it, section 95—
and speci¿ cally immigration federalism—stands as a site of concurrent 
constitutional jurisdiction with competitive DQG cooperative dimensions. 
&RQFOXVLRQIURPHFRQRP\WRFRPPXQLW\DQGEDFNDJDLQ
As an inventory management system, Express Entry is a success. It is 
dynamic, the pool of potential immigrants ¿ lls and empties constantly, 
and there are no applications older than one year because they expire out 
of the pool. As an immigrant selection system, Express Entry is a mixed 
bag. It corrects for some of the shortcomings of the old points system: 
the backlogs and stale applications, the lack of language pro¿ ciency, and, 
perhaps, the poorer labour market outcomes. In exchange, however, it 
might not dip far enough into the pool of human capital, preferring to 
prepare skilled immigrants for their ¿ rst job in Canada rather than their life 
here. Express Entry marks a devaluing of the human capital model, rather 
than its demise. However, the mode of this devaluing and the criteria which 
accomplish it contain deeper signi¿ cance for economic immigration in 
Canada.
The use of Ministerial Instructions to promulgate the entire model 
and all subsequent rounds of invitation as well as the expanded and 
institutionalized role for provinces and territories and employers in the 
selection process both portend longer-term changes to the community and 
the economy that operate in the immigration state. The rationale that the 
state needs to be competitive and quick to select the best and brightest 
economic immigrants, that it cannot be constrained by formal legislative 
procedures or stale applications, understands skilled immigrants as 
economic inputs rather than people to naturalize. And the move to reduce 
184. Seidle, VXSUD note 165 at 21.
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WKH KXPDQ FDSLWDO SDUW RI WKH SRLQWV FDOFXODWLRQ E\ SULRULWL]LQJ ODERXU
PDUNHWGHPDQGVZKHWKHUH[SUHVVHGWKURXJKWKHMRERIIHURUWKHSURYLQFLDO
QRPLQDWLRQKHLJKWHQVWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQHFRQRP\DQGFRPPXQLW\
7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKLVPRGHORIHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDWLRQLVWKDWLWGHQLHV
WKH ORQJHYLW\ RIPHPEHUVKLSZKHQ LW LVPDNLQJ WKH VHOHFWLRQ GHFLVLRQ
,W KLGHV WKH DFW RI SLFNLQJ DQG FKRRVLQJ FLWL]HQV EHKLQG WKH IXQFWLRQDO
HFRQRPLFGLVFRXUVHRISLFNLQJWDOHQWDQGVNLOODQG¿OOLQJODERXUPDUNHW
GHPDQG,QWKLVZD\LWFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHIDOVHVHQVHRIVHSDUDWLRQRIWKH
VSKHUHVRILPPLJUDWLRQDQGFLWL]HQVKLS7KHIRUPHUSRLQWVV\VWHPKDG
ÀDZVWREHVXUHEXWLWVRXJKWWRSUHSDUHHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDQWVWRHQWHU
WKHHFRQRPLFFRPPXQLW\DVSRWHQWLDOFLWL]HQVFRJQL]DQWWKDWWKH\PLJKW
FKDQJH¿UPVDQGFLWLHVDQGKRSHIXO WKDW WKHLU ODQJXDJHHGXFDWLRQDQG
JHQHUDODGDSWDELOLW\ZRXOGKHOSWKHPDGMXVW:LWK([SUHVV(QWU\WKHVSDFH
IRUFRQVLGHULQJFRPPXQLW\ZKLFKZDVEXLOWLQWRWKHKXPDQFDSLWDODQDO\VLV
LVQDUURZHG,WPDUNVDVKLIWLQORFDWLRQ²IURPWKHIHGHUDOWRWKHSURYLQFLDO
DQGIURPWKHFRPPXQLW\WRWKHODERXUPDUNHW²DQGLQWHPSRUDOLW\²IURP
ORQJWHUP FLWL]HQV WR PRUH LPPHGLDWH ZRUNHUV²WKXV SXVKLQJ &DQDGD
WRZDUGWKHQHRFRUSRUDWLVWPRGHORIHFRQRPLFLPPLJUDWLRQ([SUHVV(QWU\
VZLQJVWKHSHQGXOXP\HWDJDLQDV&DQDGDVWULYHVWRSHUIHFWWKHPHWKRGWR
PHDVXUHKXPDQEHLQJVZKRE\QDWXUHGHI\PHDVXUHPHQW
 6HH&DWKHULQH'DXYHUJQH0DNLQJ3HRSOH,OOHJDO:KDW*OREDOL]DWLRQ0HDQVIRU0LJUDWLRQDQG
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1HZ<RUN&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
